(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions

ThedThe next 5 years (1967-1972) were marked by the rebels and the Dutch recuperating their losses, stabilising frontlines, and modernising their fighting forces at a rapid pace. With Dutch control of Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula by 1969 was relegated to the coastal areas and urban centers. To deal with the new strategic reality of the situation, the KNIL was operationally integrated into the armed forces. At the same time, the usage of large-scale bombing raids, that devastated entire sections of the jungle became the norm. All of this was possible as the early investments were bearing the fruits of their labour, more advanced weapon systems, aerospace systems and ships were becoming available in massive numbers, combined with the increase in available manpower made allowed the Netherlands to become a larger and more high-quality force.

The rebels did not sit idle, controlling the interior of Sumatra and the Malaya peninsula they were able to properly build up their forces. Moving away from just an unconditional force and towards a mixed force. While never able to beat the Dutch in an open battle their new strategic concept would be that of weakened battle, bleed the dutch with a thousand cuts rather than one punch. It was a period where fighting still was taking place and by all measures was quite intense. Yet forFor the east indies crisis, it was silent, for everyone knew that both sides were preparing for the slugfest that would become the final papart