(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions
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(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit (view source)
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, 3 years agoI added a lot of military stuff but it explains the situation
Dutch-ODST (talk | contribs) (Edited in some commander names) |
Dutch-ODST (talk | contribs) (I added a lot of military stuff but it explains the situation) |
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| combatant1 = {{flagdeco|NED}} [[Kingdom of the Netherlands]] <br /> {{flagdeco|TUS|1855}} [[Tussenland]] <br /> {{flagdeco|NNL}} [[New Netherland]]
| combatant2 = [[East Indies Liberation Front]] <br /> [[Malakka]] <br /> Various Sultanates of Indonesia
| commander1 =
Willem Middendorp
| commander2 = Junaid Siahaija
Pieter-Bas Teterissa
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| casualties2 = 7-10 million civilian deaths<br>205.000 wounded<br>490.000 Missing
}}
The '''East Indies Crisis,''' (Malay: ''Krisis Hindia Timur'') also known as the '''Archipelago war,''' '''War of liberation''' and in the Netherlands as the '''Indian war''' (Dutch:
== Background ==
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the period from 1963 up to 1967 commonly called “Phase of fire” marked the rapid departure from it being a standard colonial conflict and instead of being something bigger. KNIL and now regular Dutch forces were not fighting colonial uprisings anymore but a well-organized foe. While in individual battles Dutch/KNIL units always came out on top it was the attrition rate that came with patrolling the central parts of Sumatra that were simply too high. Long-range patrols by the KNIL often resulted in 3 out of 10 men being killed, 4 more being wounded. This rate of attrition was simply far too high for the Netherlands to sustain what really woke the Dutch command structure up was the New Years’ offensive. The use of conventional military forces by the rebels combined with asymmetric warfare was a deadly one. While eventually the front was stabilized by mid-february 1963 the situation had not. Uprisings across the islands, from Malaya to Celebes and even Borneo were becoming more intense and organized. Dutch & KNIL forces were more and more divided with quelling them limiting and weakening their power projection. It was around this time that Lieutenant-General Cornelis van Langen of the Army came with a new doctrine, a doctrine that would become known as the Langen Doctrine and would change the face and nature of the war.
Het Lange-Doctrine changed the entire long-term strategic objective for the Netherlands in the war. It would not focus on reconquering the territories lost from the EILF, altho that was the eventual goal, it would instead focus upon destroying the EILF her ability to wage war and reduce her numbers through attrition. It would see the initiative move from the EILF to the Netherlands, this would be achieved by transforming the military into a highly mobile force that could react quickly to threats. This would be achieved by moving from a garrison force towards a force centered around air mobility, rapid movement of firepower, and action. Its main goal was thus to allow quick reaction and a quick and rapid shift from defensive towards offensive tactics and to prevent the tiedown of troops in hostile territory. It did require that all Urban centers on the coastline would be held as launching points for military operations.
Cornelis van Langen proposed his idea, before the general staff on the 22nd of march 1963. It was accepted on the 23rd of march 1963 and Cornelis was given the task to implement it. On the same day, orders were sent out to all units across the East Indies, to withdrawal from the interior and focus on maintaining coastal areas, urban areas, and areas of either strategic or economic importance. The EILF noted something was happening when at once Dutch forces began to pull out of the interior. Their confusion resulted in the withdrawal being relatively peaceful without much opposition. When Dutch forces arrived in their new positions they were informed of what was to take place, this was new troops being moved in their old gear discarded and new gear being given, and a change in tactics. This resulted in the remainder of 1963 and early 1964 being relatively quiet, no major operations took place and fighting was limited to skirmishes. In this period new troops with their new equipment and tactics were rotated in and soldiers were retrained and redeployed. This massive build-up of men and material was clear for all to see yet the EILF and Russian intelligence apparatuses were not sure what it exactly was. All they knew was that the Dutch were preparing for something big.
That something big was the complete and unprecedented reorganization of the Dutch military her fighting forces, training infrastructure, command structure, logistical infrastructure, and doctrine. At the end of March order had been placed at the Koolhoven aviation factory to convey their reliable and versatile “Krijgspeerd” helicopter into a military helicopter and mass produce it. This combined with other orders for new tanks, aircraft and guns resulted in the rapid development of remarkably successful military equipment. The most notable change was the reorganization and reformation of the Dutch national service or Dienstplicht. It was increased in its length and it now was to last 24 months of which 6 months would be spent on training and 18 months deployment, followed by reserve duties up until the age of 50. Before the new doctrine and the reforms the Dienstplicht period was 18 months total, the lengthening was done to train the soldier up to make him qualitatively better than any other in the world. It was realized that this new mobile style of warfare which included air mobility relied upon highly trained soldiers thus a longer national service period was added. Something that was not popular with the public but passed parliament. This period thus not only resulted in the increase of military spending, National service time, and the change in doctrine but also the start of an anti-war movement. All these reforms were put to the test in December of 1963 during operation Jambi when the first battle-ready units would be deployed in combat. These 12,000 men proved effective and further strengthened the so-called “Hervorming van Langen”.
=== Operation Blink ===
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