(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions

| caption = Two Dutch soldiers in Malaya watching the Krijgspeerd helicopters comingcome in after a battle.

the period from 1963 up to 1967 commonly called “Phase of fire” marked the rapid departure from it being a standard colonial conflict and instead of being something bigger. KNIL and now regular Dutch forces were not fighting colonial uprisings anymore but a well-organized foe. While in individual battles Dutch/KNIL units always came out on top it was the attrition rate that came with patrolling the central parts of Sumatra that were simply too high. Long-range patrols by the KNIL often resulted in 3 out of 10 men being killed, 4 more being wounded. This rate of attrition was simply far too high for the Netherlands to sustain what really woke the Dutch command structure up was the New Years’ offensive. The use of conventional military forces by the rebels combined with asymmetric warfare was a deadly one. While eventually the front was stabilized by mid-februaryFebruary 1963 the situation had not. Uprisings across the islands, from Malaya to Celebes and even Borneo were becoming more intense and organized. Dutch & KNIL forces were more and more divided with quelling them limiting and weakening their power projection. It was around this time that Lieutenant-General <u>''Cornelis van Langen''</u> of the Army came with a new doctrine, a doctrine that would become known as the Langen <u>Lange-Doctrine</u> and would change the face and nature of the war.

Het '''Lange-Doctrine''' as it was called was simple and brutally effective when implemented and embraced. With the implementation of the doctrine, the nature of the objectives and the fighting shifted drastically in favor of the Netherlands. Before its implementation and around the new Year offensive (Nieuwejaars offensief), the KNIL and the Landmacht were fighting a war of reconquering lost lands. It had the aim to retake the territory lost to the East Indies Liberation Front. This meant that progress was slow and casualties were high, higher than could be sustained. These high casualties were due to the EILF her home-field advantage, it knew the terrain and the locals and got warned whenever a Dutch patrol was nearby and then attacked. It at the same time tied down large numbers of valuable troops in the middle of Sumatra and parts of Malaya, waisting their combat effectiveness and making them targets for the EILF.