Operation Oranje Leeu: Difference between revisions

 

Post-war writing by senior Amerikaner officers like General J. Tymmerman, General Greveling, and military historians of the ''Staatse archieven'' led by the former ''Overlieutenant'' (Lieutenant-Colonel) Willem Morkal , managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that the political resistance by the goverment in the full implementation of the plan which would include a targeted ICBM strike upon key Mexican cities and political and military centers turned the war from a strategic beheading of Mexico, thus turning it into a conflict where Mexico was able to effectively respond. Thus by that narrative, it was not NNL strategic miscalculation that denied Nieuw Nederlandt the quick, decisive conflict it should have been. In 2011, Gerard Jannitje published ''Een Kritiek op operatie Oranje Leeu haar Mythe'' (A critique upon the myth of Operatie Oranje Leeu), which began a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Operatie Oranje Leeu were subjected to scrutiny and contextualization. Treating the plan as a blueprint was rejected because this was contrary to the tradition of Amerikaner war planning established by Willem Teunissen, in which military operations were considered to be inherently unpredictable. Mobilization and deployment plans were essential but campaign plans were pointless; rather than attempting to dictate to subordinate commanders, the commander gave the intent of the operation and subordinates achieved it through ''Krijgs tactieken''(mission-type tactics).