Operation Oranje Leeu
Operatie Oranje Leeu (commonly known as Oranje Leeu or just Orange) refers to a series of Nieuw Nederlandt general staff war plans for dealing with a possible cross-continental war with Mexico during the mid and late 20th centuries. It detailed the mobilization, transportation, combat goals, and overall doctrine for such a conflict with Mexico, the plan was always considered less of an instruction and more of a guideline for such a conflict. When it was enacted in 2002 nearly 40 years of development were put into practice. With the execution of the plan in the Boer crisis it has come under critical review overall it has been accepted by military historians, Historians and political circled that the military aspect of the plan was a success yet it underestimated Mexico her ability to counter-attack, yet at the time it was hailed as a success by the people in NNL and through the Amerikaner sphere.
Post-war writing by senior Amerikaner officers like General J. Tymmerman, General Greveling, and military historians of the Staatse archieven led by the former Overlieutenant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Willem Morkal , managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that the political resistance by the goverment in the full implementation of the plan which would include a targeted ICBM strike upon key Mexican cities and political and military centers turned the war from a strategic beheading of Mexico, thus turning it into a conflict where Mexico was able to effectively respond. Thus by that narrative, it was not NNL strategic miscalculation that denied Nieuw Nederlandt the quick, decisive conflict it should have been. In 2011, Gerard Jannitje published Een Kritiek op operatie Oranje Leeu haar Mythe (A critique upon the myth of Operatie Oranje Leeu), which began a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Operatie Oranje Leeu were subjected to scrutiny and contextualization. Treating the plan as a blueprint was rejected because this was contrary to the tradition of Amerikaner war planning established by Willem Teunissen, in which military operations were considered to be inherently unpredictable. Mobilization and deployment plans were essential but campaign plans were pointless; rather than attempting to dictate to subordinate commanders, the commander gave the intent of the operation and subordinates achieved it through Krijgs tactieken(mission-type tactics).
