(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions

theThe period from 1963 up to 1967 commonly called “Phase of fire” marked the rapid departure from it being a standard colonial conflict and instead of being something bigger. KNIL and now regular Dutch forces were not fighting colonial uprisings anymore but a well-organized foe. While in individual battles Dutch/KNIL units always came out on top it was the attrition rate that came with patrolling the central parts of Sumatra that were simply too high. Long-range patrols by the KNIL often resulted in 3 out of 10 men being killed, 4 more being wounded. This rate of attrition was simply far too high for the Netherlands to sustain what really woke the Dutch command structure up was the New Years’ offensive. The use of conventional military forces by the rebels combined with asymmetric warfare was a deadly one. While eventually the front was stabilized by mid-February 1963 the situation had not. Uprisings across the islands, from Malaya to Celebes and even Borneo were becoming more intense and organized. Dutch & KNIL forces were more and more spread thin with quelling the insurgencies. This started limiting and weakening their power projection capabilities in the region. It was around this time (April 1963) that Lieutenant-General <u>''Cornelis van Langen''</u> of the Army came with a new doctrine, a doctrine that would become known as the <u>Lange-Doctrine</u> and would change the face and nature of the war.