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== Phase of Fire ==
the period from 1963 up to 1967 commonly called “Phase of fire” marked the rapid departure from it being a standard colonial conflict and instead of being something bigger. KNIL and now regular Dutch forces were not fighting colonial uprisings anymore but a well-organized foe. While in individual battles Dutch/KNIL units always came out on top it was the attrition rate that came with patrolling the central parts of Sumatra that were simply too high. Long-range patrols by the KNIL often resulted in 3 out of 10 men being killed, 4 more being wounded. This rate of attrition was simply far too high for the Netherlands to sustain what really woke the Dutch command structure up was the New Years’ offensive. The use of conventional military forces by the rebels combined with asymmetric warfare was a deadly one. While eventually the front was stabilized by mid-february 1963 the situation had not. Uprisings across the islands, from Malaya to Celebes and even Borneo were becoming more intense and organized. Dutch & KNIL forces were more and more divided with quelling them limiting and weakening their power projection. It was around this time that Lieutenant-General Cornelis van Langen of the Army came with a new doctrine, a doctrine that would become known as the Langen Doctrine and would change the face and nature of the war.
The '''Langen Doctrine''' as it was simply called was quite simple in its principle yet brutally effective. It not only shifted the objectives of military operations across the archipelago but also the nature of the fighting in itself. While before the new Year offensive the KNIL/Army her objective was to retake the territory held by the rebels, mainly central Sumatra, and after the new Year offensive parts of Malaya. However, the rebels were deadly in the jungle using their contacts in the countryside and their knowledge of the terrain to lay waste to the patrols going in. The reason for such an objective was quite simple the Dutch colonial administration had the goal to reconquer and bring back order to the territories while the fighting was still going on through the use of garrisons tying up troops.
The Langen Doctrine would see a shift in warfare with mobility and overwhelming firepower being key. The goal is to destroy the rebels their ability to wage war by hitting their supply lines and areas of operations. All the while using air power and mobile forces to prevent Dutch forces from being tied down in areas. This emphasis on mobility Langen argued would allow them to respond rapidly to insurgent activity, all the while making it possible to shift quickly between offensive and defensive operations. The doctrine shift was proposed to the general staff in march of 1963 and accepted on the 22nd of March. On the same day, orders were given to all units in the indies to move towards defensible positions and hold on to the urban centers and defend them at all costs. Van Langen has estimated that for this doctrine to be effective a period of 10 months would need to be spent on training the soldiers, getting the equipment, and getting the airpower in place. Through 1963 and early 1964 the fighting in the archipelago changed into something more static. This period put the rebels off and for a while activities even seized as their intelligence networks were unable to determine what was happing, all that they knew from their Russian sources was that the Dutch were preparing for something.
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