(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions

| commander1 = Cornelis van Langen

Willem Middendorp

The '''East Indies Crisis,''' (Malay: ''Krisis Hindia Timur'') also known as the '''Archipelago war,''' '''War of liberation''' and in the Netherlands as the '''Indian war''' (Dutch: ''Indische oorlog''), or ''Oostelijke acties'' (Eastern actions) was a conflict fought through the Indonesian archipelago, with major area’s of combat being on the islands of Sumatra, Borneo, Malay peninsula, Java and Celebs. Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and her allies and the East Indies Liberation Front. Fought from 1960 up to 11th of November 1976 when Batavia fell to the East Indies Liberation Front. It was one of the last and largest colonial conflicts fought in the 20th century, involving not just the Netherlands but also numerous Allies and the British, and was part of the larger cold war. Facing them was the East Indies Liberation Front that was backed by numerous local supporters but mainly by Russia.  Although the war is considered a proxy war in the Anglo-Saxon historical literature, due to Britain and Russia using their proxies to fight one another, this view is disputed by many historians both from the East Indies Federation and the Netherlands, and The Batavosphere as a whole. In the Netherlands and in general, within the Batavosphere the conflict is seen as a separate conflict from the cold war, while heavily influenced by cold war events it stands on its own legs. This is due to a variety of reasons but mainly according to some historians the need for the Netherlands and Dutch society as a whole to rationalize their actions, to rationalize 16 years of brutal warfare and tens of thousands of Dutchmen that never came home and the hundreds of thousands that were permanently scarred by the war.  The East Indies Crisis was also the first televised war with people seeing the extent of the fighting and the brutality of it every night on their TVs. This shaped not just the Netherlands ‘ public perception of the war but also the global perception of the war, it showed to the world that this war and all wars are a brutal affair. The war left millions dead and even more homeless and wounded and it is seen today by historians as one of the most brutal wars fought in the 20th century. While the reasons for its end are still debated today the generally accepted narrative is that the Netherlands itself pulled out and eventually realized what it had done and stopped the war. It left behind an archipelago forever changed and never to be the same again.

Het Lange-Doctrine as it was called was simple and brutally effective when implemented and embraced. With the implementation of the doctrine, the nature of the objectives and the fighting shifted drastically in favor of the Netherlands. Before its implementation and around the new Year offensive (Nieuwejaars offensief), the KNIL and the Landmacht were fighting a war of reconquering lost lands. It had the aim to retake the territory lost to the East Indies Liberation Front. This meant that progress was slow and casualties were high, higher than could be sustained. These high casualties were due to the EILF her home-field advantage, it knew the terrain and the locals and got warned whenever a Dutch patrol was nearby and then attacked. It at the same time tied down large numbers of valuable troops in the middle of Sumatra and parts of Malaya, waisting their combat effectiveness and making them targets for the EILF.

Het Lange-Doctrine changed the entire long-term strategic objective for the Netherlands in the war. It would not focus on reconquering the territories lost from the EILF, altho that was the eventual goal, it would instead focus upon destroying the EILF her ability to wage war and reduce her numbers through attrition. It would see the initiative move from the EILF to the Netherlands, this would be achieved by transforming the military into a highly mobile force that could react quickly to threats. This would be achieved by moving from a garrison force towards a force centered around air mobility, rapid movement of firepower, and action. Its main goal was thus to allow quick reaction and a quick and rapid shift from defensive towards offensive tactics and to prevent the tiedown of troops in hostile territory. It did require that all Urban centers on the coastline would be held as launching points for military operations.

Cornelis van Langen proposed his idea, before the general staff on the 22nd of march 1963. It was accepted on the 23rd of march 1963 and Cornelis was given the task to implement it. On the same day, orders were sent out to all units across the East Indies, to withdrawal from the interior and focus on maintaining coastal areas, urban areas, and areas of either strategic or economic importance. The EILF noted something was happening when at once Dutch forces began to pull out of the interior. Their confusion resulted in the withdrawal being relatively peaceful without much opposition. When Dutch forces arrived in their new positions they were informed of what was to take place, this was new troops being moved in their old gear discarded and new gear being given, and a change in tactics. This resulted in the remainder of 1963 and early 1964 being relatively quiet, no major operations took place and fighting was limited to skirmishes. In this period new troops with their new equipment and tactics were rotated in and soldiers were retrained and redeployed. This massive build-up of men and material was clear for all to see yet the EILF and Russian intelligence apparatuses were not sure what it exactly was. All they knew was that the Dutch were preparing for something big.

That something big was the complete and unprecedented reorganization of the Dutch military her fighting forces, training infrastructure, command structure, logistical infrastructure, and doctrine. At the end of March order had been placed at the Koolhoven aviation factory to convey their reliable and versatile “Krijgspeerd” helicopter into a military helicopter and mass produce it. This combined with other orders for new tanks, aircraft and guns resulted in the rapid development of remarkably successful military equipment. The most notable change was the reorganization and reformation of the Dutch national service or Dienstplicht. It was increased in its length and it now was to last 24 months of which 6 months would be spent on training and 18 months deployment, followed by reserve duties up until the age of 50. Before the new doctrine and the reforms the Dienstplicht period was 18 months total, the lengthening was done to train the soldier up to make him qualitatively better than any other in the world. It was realized that this new mobile style of warfare which included air mobility relied upon highly trained soldiers thus a longer national service period was added. Something that was not popular with the public but passed parliament. This period thus not only resulted in the increase of military spending, National service time, and the change in doctrine but also the start of an anti-war movement. All these reforms were put to the test in December of 1963 during operation Jambi when the first battle-ready units would be deployed in combat. These 12,000 men proved effective and further strengthened the so-called “Hervorming van Langen”.