(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions
(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit (view source)
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The period from 1963 up to 1967 commonly called “Phase of fire” marked the rapid departure from it being a standard colonial conflict and instead of being something bigger. KNIL and now regular Dutch forces were not fighting colonial uprisings anymore but a well-organized foe. While in individual battles Dutch/KNIL units always came out on top it was the attrition rate that came with patrolling the central parts of Sumatra that were simply too high. Long-range patrols by the KNIL often resulted in 3 out of 10 men being killed, 4 more being wounded. This rate of attrition was simply far too high for the Netherlands to sustain what really woke the Dutch command structure up was the New Years’ offensive. The use of conventional military forces by the rebels combined with asymmetric warfare was a deadly one. While eventually the front was stabilized by mid-February 1963 the situation had not. Uprisings across the islands, from Malaya to Celebes and even Borneo were becoming more intense and organized. Dutch & KNIL forces were more and more spread thin with quelling the insurgencies. This started limiting and weakening their power projection capabilities in the region. It was around this time (April 1963) that Lieutenant-General <u>''Cornelis van Langen''</u> of the Army came with a new doctrine, a doctrine that would become known as the <u>Lange-Doctrine</u> and would change the face and nature of the war.
The '''<u>Lange-Doctrine</u>''' as it was called was as simple as it was effective. As it was implemented the Netherlands shifted its fighting style and objectives in such a way that the war become more favorable to them.
Het '''Lange-Doctrine''' as it was called was simple and brutally effective when implemented and embraced. With the implementation of the doctrine, the nature of the objectives and the fighting shifted drastically in favor of the Netherlands. Before its implementation and around the new Year offensive (Nieuwejaars offensief), the KNIL and the Landmacht were fighting a war of reconquering lost lands. It had the aim to retake the territory lost to the East Indies Liberation Front. This meant that progress was slow and casualties were high, higher than could be sustained. These high casualties were due to the EILF her home-field advantage, it knew the terrain and the locals and got warned whenever a Dutch patrol was nearby and then attacked. It at the same time tied down large numbers of valuable troops in the middle of Sumatra and parts of Malaya, wasting their combat effectiveness and making them targets for the EILF. ▼
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The Lange-Doctrine changed the entire long-term strategic objective for the Netherlands. It would no longer focus on reconquering the territories lost from the EILF, although it was the long-term objective. Instead, it would focus its fighting power on destroying the EILF her ability to wage war. This meant that now victories where counties in the casualties caused to the EILF, it now meant that it would destroy areas of support hit supply lines hard and no longer show mercy.
This shift changed the nature of the conflict in that now the Netherlands was taking the initiative. For it transformed the military into a mobile force that could quickly react to threats, move around the peninsula rapidly and attack anywhere and often simultaneously. This was achieved by moving from a garrison force to a highly mechanized and airmobile force that had the ability to rapidly mobile a great deal of firepower. This allowed for more offensive operations to be planned and executed and would remove the many troops tied down on garrison duty spread through the archipelago. It leant upon the fact that the Netherlands would be able to maintain control of all major urban centers and all major port cities.
Cornelis van Langen proposed his idea, before the general staff on the 22nd of march 1963. It was accepted on the 23rd of march 1963 and Cornelis was given the task to implement it. On the same day, orders were sent out to all units across the East Indies, to withdrawal from the interior and focus on maintaining coastal areas, urban areas, and areas of either strategic or economic importance. The EILF noted something was happening when at once Dutch forces began to pull out of the interior. Their confusion resulted in the withdrawal being relatively peaceful without much opposition. When Dutch forces arrived in their new positions they were informed of what was to take place, this was new troops being moved in their old gear discarded and new gear being given, and a change in tactics. This resulted in the remainder of 1963 and early 1964 being relatively quiet, no major operations took place and fighting was limited to skirmishes. In this period new troops with their new equipment and tactics were rotated in and soldiers were retrained and redeployed. This massive build-up of men and material was clear for all to see yet the EILF and Russian intelligence apparatuses were not sure what it exactly was. All they knew was that the Dutch were preparing for something big.
That something big was the complete and unprecedented
=== Operation Slagthuis ===
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