(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions
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Dutch-ODST (talk | contribs) (→Aftermath: the idea is that we examine the technical and doctrinal implications of the conflict for a framework of how realistically the wars in RTL are to be fought.) |
Dutch-ODST (talk | contribs) (→A shift in doctrine: Added this part to give greater detail) |
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====A shift in doctrine====
'''Lange doctrine''' often referred to by some of its opponents as the “terror doctrine”, a doctrine still today held in the military of the Netherlands. Was the radical shift in the way the Netherlands conducted the war. It saw a rapid shift in the objectives, fighting styles and ways of achieving said objectives, as well as the command structure.
The reason for the radical shift in doctrine was the new Year offensive. It showed the faults within the standard doctrine of the Netherlands. the Netherlands in response to the offensive pushed to retake the lost lands, something that resulted in a massive loss of manpower due to the attrition of the fighting. It showed that this way of fighting, of holding lands could simply not be sustained for more than maybe 4 years. The high casualties, the Soenda rebel's home field advantage combined with their higher recruitment numbers, shorter supply lines and increased rates of high-tech weapon possession meant that a change was needed.
“''Annihilate the rebels' ability to fight the war, not just this one but for all future conflicts.''”
It now would not see victories as taking the land rather, it would see the victories in the form of destroying supply dumps, logistical hubs, supply networks, and recruitment fields, destroying or depopulating areas of recruitment, no longer would the Dutch show mercy you were either with them or against them.
This shift in the way of fighting, changed the nature of the conflict, from now on the Netherlands was taking the initiative rather than reacting to Soendanese attacks. It saw the rapid restructuring of the military into a mobile force able to respond rapidly to a multitude of threats simultaneously. It necessitated the proliferation of airborne response forces, rapid mechanization of the military forces and upgrades in the organic firepower available to local commanders. This rapid shift made it possible for more offensive operations to be conducted and it removed valuable manpower from simple garrison duty in lands that were not viable to be held at the moment. It in essence meant the Netherlands would hold control of the major urban area their surrounding lands, valuable economic sites and the coastal areas and waters.
Kolonel Cornelis van Langen proposed this idea before the general staff on the 22nd of march 1963, and it was accepted on the 23rd of march 1963. This resulted in Cornelis his promotion to General with a simple mission, put together a team and reform the military. It would on that same day see the rapid planning for the transformation of the military of the Netherlands. It would see units withdrawn to the designed areas. It left the rebellion in some confusion as the Netherlands withdrew from lands it had just taken back. This consolidation of the valuable lands allowed the military to rotate the old troops back to the Netherlands or Zeylan for retraining and rotating the new forces.
This respite that lasted from march 1963 up until early 1964 would see the rapid retraining shift in the quality of Dutch forces. It would see the build-up of men and material for the new way of fighting, as it happened Russian intelligence sources were unable to determine the reason for this rapid shift in doctrine, equipment and the like. While many people think this was something that happened rapidly, it was just a consolidation of already planned rapid replacement of equipment, such as armoured vehicles, air vehicles and uniforms and weapons.
====Moving to a war footing====
This radical shift in military doctrine was not something completely unprecedented, as in the great war. The Netherlands since the great war made it law that all factories would be able to move to wartime production and that those capabilities would be maintained, as technology progressed. This law combined with the Netherlands' basic defence policy having it possible to conscript large parts of the population rapidly meant the foundations were present.
At the end of March, the orders had been placed with requirements at most military companies to develop new weapons of war. These weapons were delivered at a pace unseen before in dutch history as it led to the mass production of remarkably effective, efficient military equipment. At the same time orders were placed with specifications at foreign factories in Tauland, Nieuw Nederland. The most notable change was the reorganization and reformation of the system of conscription or Dienstplicht. Its duration of service was increased to 24 months, of which 6 months were basic training, which was made longer to increase the quality of the soldier, and the remaining 18 months were on deployment, with the requirement to be called up in times of conflict to last up until the age of 50.
Before these organization reforms, the Diensplicht had more of a “reserve” role, in that it was there to increase the size of the reserves. Yet after the reforms, the expansion of the training regime, the educational requirements and the average Dutch conscript were quantitatively better than any other in the world. This expansion in the military education of the average conscript was done to allow that the new style of mobile warfare, was not allowed if the old requirements where there.
It was something that was not popular with the public yet was able to be passed in parliament, as the conservative party her voters were often not eligible for conscription themselves. This period thus only resulted in increased military spending, a longer national service time and a change in doctrine which resulted in an intenser conflict. It also would see the rise of the anti-war movement, a movement that called for the Netherlands to pull out of Indonesia and seek an ap peaceful solution.
All these reforms tho were put to the test in December of 1963 during operation “Testveld”, this operation would see approximately 12,000 fresh-faced recruits, equipped with the newest equipment and new vehicles and a new training regime go ou and about in Malaya. It resulted in approximately 57,000 enemy combatants killed at the cost of 1200 of their own. It was thus proven to be a success and they were further implemented.
===Operation Slachthuis===
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