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(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions

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(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit (view source)

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(→‎Aftermath: the idea is that we examine the technical and doctrinal implications of the conflict for a framework of how realistically the wars in RTL are to be fought.)
(→‎A shift in doctrine: Added this part to give greater detail)
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====A shift in doctrine====
'''Lange doctrine''' often referred to by some of its opponents as the “terror doctrine”, a doctrine still today held in the military of the Netherlands. Was the radical shift in the way the Netherlands conducted the war. It saw a rapid shift in the objectives, fighting styles and ways of achieving said objectives, as well as the command structure.
The '''<u>Lange Doctrine</u>''' as it was called was as simple as it was effective. As it was implemented the Netherlands shifted its fighting style and objectives in such a way that the war become more favorable to them.
 
The reason for the radical shift in doctrine was the new Year offensive. It showed the faults within the standard doctrine of the Netherlands. the Netherlands in response to the offensive pushed to retake the lost lands, something that resulted in a massive loss of manpower due to the attrition of the fighting. It showed that this way of fighting, of holding lands could simply not be sustained for more than maybe 4 years. The high casualties, the Soenda rebel's home field advantage combined with their higher recruitment numbers, shorter supply lines and increased rates of high-tech weapon possession meant that a change was needed.
Before its implementation, around the New Year’s offensive (Nieuwejaars offensief), the KNIL and the Landmacht were fighting a war of reconquering lost lands. It had the aim to retake the territory lost to the East Indies Liberation Front. This meant that progress was slow and casualties were high, higher than could be sustained in the long term. The high number of casualties was due to the EILF her home-field advantage, for it knew the terrain and the locals and got warned whenever a Dutch patrol was nearby and then attacked. It at the same time tied down large numbers of valuable troops in the middle of Sumatra and parts of Malaya, wasting them away in the jungle where they only were target practice for the EILF.
 
TheThis led then colonel van Lange-Doctrine changedto come up with a solution to the problem, it would change the entire long-term strategic objectiveobjectives forof the Netherlands. It would no longer focus on reconqueringholding theand territoriestaking lost fromback the EILFland, although it was the long-term objective. Instead,rather it would focushold itsvaluable fightingareas powerand onoperate destroyingout theof EILFthose her ability to wage warareas. ThisIt meantwould thatinstead nowput victoriesits wherefocus countieson infighting the casualtiesSoendanese causedrebels toand thesimply EILF,in itthe now meant that it would destroy areaswords of support hit supply lines hard and no longer show mercy.van Lange;
 
“''Annihilate the rebels' ability to fight the war, not just this one but for all future conflicts.''”
This shift changed the nature of the conflict in that now the Netherlands was taking the initiative. For it transformed the military into a mobile force that could quickly react to threats, move around the peninsula rapidly and attack anywhere and often simultaneously. This was achieved by moving from a garrison force to a highly mechanized and airmobile force that had the ability to rapidly mobile a great deal of firepower. This allowed for more offensive operations to be planned and executed and would remove the many troops tied down on garrison duty spread through the archipelago. It leant upon the fact that the Netherlands would be able to maintain control of all major urban centers and all major port cities.
 
It now would not see victories as taking the land rather, it would see the victories in the form of destroying supply dumps, logistical hubs, supply networks, and recruitment fields, destroying or depopulating areas of recruitment, no longer would the Dutch show mercy you were either with them or against them.
Cornelis van Langen proposed his idea, before the general staff on the 22nd of march 1963. It was accepted on the 23rd of march 1963 and Cornelis was given the task to implement it. On the same day, orders were sent out to all units across the East Indies, to withdrawal from the interior and focus on maintaining coastal areas, urban areas, and areas of either strategic or economic importance. The EILF noted something was happening when at once Dutch forces began to pull out of the interior. Their confusion resulted in the withdrawal being relatively peaceful without much opposition. When Dutch forces arrived in their new positions they were informed of what was to take place, this was new troops being moved in their old gear discarded and new gear being given, and a change in tactics. This resulted in the remainder of 1963 and early 1964 being relatively quiet, no major operations took place and fighting was limited to skirmishes. In this period new troops with their new equipment and tactics were rotated in and soldiers were retrained and redeployed. This massive build-up of men and material was clear for all to see yet the EILF and Russian intelligence apparatuses were not sure what it exactly was. All they knew was that the Dutch were preparing for something big.
 
This shift in the way of fighting, changed the nature of the conflict, from now on the Netherlands was taking the initiative rather than reacting to Soendanese attacks. It saw the rapid restructuring of the military into a mobile force able to respond rapidly to a multitude of threats simultaneously. It necessitated the proliferation of airborne response forces, rapid mechanization of the military forces and upgrades in the organic firepower available to local commanders. This rapid shift made it possible for more offensive operations to be conducted and it removed valuable manpower from simple garrison duty in lands that were not viable to be held at the moment. It in essence meant the Netherlands would hold control of the major urban area their surrounding lands, valuable economic sites and the coastal areas and waters.
 
Kolonel Cornelis van Langen proposed this idea before the general staff on the 22nd of march 1963, and it was accepted on the 23rd of march 1963. This resulted in Cornelis his promotion to General with a simple mission, put together a team and reform the military. It would on that same day see the rapid planning for the transformation of the military of the Netherlands. It would see units withdrawn to the designed areas. It left the rebellion in some confusion as the Netherlands withdrew from lands it had just taken back. This consolidation of the valuable lands allowed the military to rotate the old troops back to the Netherlands or Zeylan for retraining and rotating the new forces.
 
This respite that lasted from march 1963 up until early 1964 would see the rapid retraining shift in the quality of Dutch forces. It would see the build-up of men and material for the new way of fighting, as it happened Russian intelligence sources were unable to determine the reason for this rapid shift in doctrine, equipment and the like. While many people think this was something that happened rapidly, it was just a consolidation of already planned rapid replacement of equipment, such as armoured vehicles, air vehicles and uniforms and weapons.
 
====Moving to a war footing====
This radical shift in military doctrine was not something completely unprecedented, as in the great war. The Netherlands since the great war made it law that all factories would be able to move to wartime production and that those capabilities would be maintained, as technology progressed. This law combined with the Netherlands' basic defence policy having it possible to conscript large parts of the population rapidly meant the foundations were present.
That something big was the complete and unprecedented reorganisation of the Dutch military her fighting forces, training infrastructure, command structure, logistical infrastructure, and doctrine. At the end of March a order had been placed at the '''Koolhoven Aviation Factory''' to increase the production of their reliable "Krijg-peerd" helicopter. This combined with other orders for armored vehicles, tanks aircraft and guns resulted in the rapid development of remarkably successful military equipment. However the mass increase in production of military equipment meant a rapid expansion of existing capabilities to not intervene with normal economic production, thus a certain limit was created and other production centers where sought abroad in Taulandt and Nieuw Nederlandt pumping a considerable amount of money into their respective industries. The most notable change was the reorganization and reformation of the Dutch national service or ''Dienstplicht''. It was increased in its length and it now was to last 24 months of which 6 months would be spent on training and 18 months deployment, followed by reserve duties up until the age of 50. Before the new doctrine and the reforms the ''Dienstplicht'' period was 18 months total, the lengthening was done to train the soldier up to make him qualitatively better than any other in the world. It was realized that this new mobile style of warfare which included air mobility relied upon highly trained soldiers thus a longer national service period was added. Something that was not popular with the public but passed parliament. This period thus not only resulted in the increase of military spending, National service time, and the change in doctrine but also the start of an anti-war movement. All these reforms were put to the test in December of 1963 during operation Jambi when the first battle-ready units would be deployed in combat. These 12,000 men proved effective and further solidified the so-called “Hervorming van Langen”.
 
At the end of March, the orders had been placed with requirements at most military companies to develop new weapons of war. These weapons were delivered at a pace unseen before in dutch history as it led to the mass production of remarkably effective, efficient military equipment. At the same time orders were placed with specifications at foreign factories in Tauland, Nieuw Nederland. The most notable change was the reorganization and reformation of the system of conscription or Dienstplicht. Its duration of service was increased to 24 months, of which 6 months were basic training, which was made longer to increase the quality of the soldier, and the remaining 18 months were on deployment, with the requirement to be called up in times of conflict to last up until the age of 50.  
 
Before these organization reforms, the Diensplicht had more of a “reserve” role, in that it was there to increase the size of the reserves. Yet after the reforms, the expansion of the training regime, the educational requirements and the average Dutch conscript were quantitatively better than any other in the world. This expansion in the military education of the average conscript was done to allow that the new style of mobile warfare, was not allowed if the old requirements where there.
 
It was something that was not popular with the public yet was able to be passed in parliament, as the conservative party her voters were often not eligible for conscription themselves. This period thus only resulted in increased military spending, a longer national service time and a change in doctrine which resulted in an intenser conflict. It also would see the rise of the anti-war movement, a movement that called for the Netherlands to pull out of Indonesia and seek an ap peaceful solution.
 
All these reforms tho were put to the test in December of 1963 during operation “Testveld”, this operation would see approximately 12,000 fresh-faced recruits, equipped with the newest equipment and new vehicles and a new training regime go ou and about in Malaya. It resulted in approximately 57,000 enemy combatants killed at the cost of 1200 of their own. It was thus proven to be a success and they were further implemented.
 
===Operation Slachthuis===
Dutch-ODST
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