(Old page) East Indies Crisis - do not edit: Difference between revisions

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* Refugee crisis
| combatant1 = {{flagdeco|NED}} [[Kingdom of the Netherlands]] <br /> [[Britain]] <br /> [[The Philippines]]
| combatant2 = [[Soendanese Liberation Front]] <br /> [[Russia]] <br /> [[Pinang]] <br /> [[Thai]]
| commander1 = Cornelis van Langen </br> Willem Middendorp
| commander2 = Soedjojo Soesanto </br> Soerjadi Nazir </br> Kasan Said Narajau </br> Junaid Siahaija </br> Pieter-Bas Teterissa </br> Bassil Patawala
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==Background ==
 
The Dutch East Indies found itself under a period of intensified turmoil following the aftermath of the [[Great War|Great War (1935-1939)]]. The [[Netherlands]], having experienced economic and industrial exhaustion as a result, relied heavily on its East Indies colony for the extraction of raw natural resources. This dependency caused an increasing strain on the region, leading to a series of sweeping reforms and elevated colonial pressures to exploit the colony.
=== Social changes & the Djohor Uprising ===
In the aftermath of the great war, the Netherlands suffered greatly in a short time. The lowlands campaign, combined with the eventual grinding down of the French advance along the Rhine had exhausted the Netherland's industrial capacity. Its factories in the south were either destroyed or badly damaged, its production centers in the north working overtime to provide the goods needed to rebuild the south. All of this required raw natural resources, thus that more pressure was put upon the Dutch East Indies, the crown jewel in the Dutch empire to deliver the resources to rebuild the Netherlands.
 
==== The Herschikking reform ====
This pressure led to a series of reforms that would change how the east indies were governed. The first of the reforms started in 1941, would see a large-scale centralization of governance in the east indies. Many former client states and protectorates in the region were stripped of their remaining powers and confined to increasingly just a ceremonial role.
In 1941, in an attempt to maximize resource extraction efficiency, the Netherlands initiated a centralization reform called the ''Herschikking (''"reordering") in the Dutch East Indies. This included the large-scale mechanization of the agricultural sector, causing unprecedented social changes. Mass internal migration, rapid urbanization, and the emergence of informal housing in urban areas became the norm. Meanwhile, the political authority of several local sultanates and kingdoms, Djohor included, was significantly curtailed, fueling a sense of dissatisfaction and unrest among the local populace.
 
=== Social changes & the= Djohor Uprising ====
All of these reforms had a simple goal, to make the extraction of resources from the east indies more effective and increase productivity. It would see the mass mechanization of the agricultural sector, which led to mass internal migration and urbanization as many traditional rural communities were uprooted. Swelling the urban population immensely to a point that many cities simply did not have the resources to deal with the migrants leading to the growth of shantytowns and other informal housing. This, in turn, led to a rise in crime, poverty and resentment towards the Dutch colonial authorities who did not provide adequate public services or attempt to remedy the growing social ills.
==== '''The {{Main|Djohor Uprising''' ====}}
The dissatisfaction led to the Djohor Uprising in 1952, where the Sultanate of Djohor and other anti-colonial forces rebelled against colonial troops. The brutal response of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) to the rebellion led to a wave of atrocities and international condemnation, further intensifying anti-colonial sentiments among the Soendanese people. The collective memory of the uprising, alongside the execution of the Djohor Sultan and his family, incited outrage and served as a potent symbol of Dutch colonial oppression.
 
The radicalization of the Soendanese intelligentsia and the Muslim middle and lower classes can be traced back to these events. Their political mobilization and subsequent involvement were instrumental in the eruption of the East Indies Crisis. Simultaneously, the Dutch East Indies government's isolation and repeated failure to manage internal tensions only served to compound these issues.
==== Unrest in Djohor ====
As the 40's progressed there was little sign that the social ills of the East Indies would be changing and the political neutering of the traditional local sultanates and kingdoms led to constant internal political struggle. The Sultanate of Djohor felt many of these problems intensely with both heavy elite dissatisfaction with their now powerless position and high levels of social unrest in the rapidly urbanizing cities of the region. In the late 40s the Sultan started to gather allies among different anti-colonial political parties as well as staff the royal guard and provincial police with supporters. In particular the Sultan started to gain followers and allies in the conservative ''Santri'' Islamic anti-colonial ''Partai Rakyat Islam Johor (PRIJ).'' Using their privileged position close the Sultan, the party (along with other political actors unhappy with heavy handed Dutch reforms started to sway the sultan towards revolt. They argued that the Netherlands was weak due to internal political upheaval, the lingering economic effects of the great war and a geopolitical refocusing of key military assets towards Europe. The Sultan was eventually convinced and after a year of preparations in secret, gathering arms and consolidating their position they decided to strike.
 
In the wake of the Djohor Uprising, the Dutch East Indies government sought to regain control through a series of harsh reforms and security measures. However, these actions only heightened tensions, leading to sporadic rebellions and further unrest. As the socio-political situation deteriorated, it eventually culminated into the East Indies Crisis.
On the '''4th of May 1952''' in the early hours of the morning, local Dutch administrators across Djohor were killed in their beds and Dutch loyalist police forces were arrested and executed. This was the start of what would become known as the Djohor uprising, or as it's known in Soenda “The Butchering of Djohor”.
 
==== '''The Djohor Uprising''' ====
With the successful neutralization of KNIL & DEI government forces in the sultanate, the Sultan's forces believed that they could consolidate their position and withstand any Dutch or colonial counter offensive. It was also the belief that the Netherlands would not be able to deploy the forces needed to deal with the uprising. Outrage and fear struck colonial authorities once news reached Batavia that Djohor had rebelled and neutralized the local DEI forces. Batavia in this period was under a great deal of pressure from the Netherlands to facilitate the exploitation of cheap natural resources from the East Indies. The Hague could not tolerate any form of rebellion, they could not allow the loss of what was in essence their temporary economic lifeline, in rebuilding the Netherlands.
[[File:Dutch soldiers landing in Malaya during the 1950 emergency.jpg|thumb|The 9th Batavian regiment disembarking near Djohor prior to the start of the Djohor counteroffensive. ]]
 
The Dutch East Indies Governor-General ''Martien van der Goot'' believed that the Djohor rebellion had to be stopped in order to avoid a "domino effect" of rebellions across the East Indies. Additionally the governor- general took personal slight with the ease that the Djohor sultanate was able to dispatch the Dutch authorities in the region, which later informed DEI colonial policy in the lead up to the East Indies Crisis in the 1960s & 70s. As shown from recently released documents Governor-General Martiem van der Goot thus ordered, the commander of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) Lieutenant-Generaal J.A. Vetter, the following: “Make an example out of these rebels kill them all.”
 
Commander Vetter, a veteran of countless wars (such as the Corean expedition, the Rhine front, the east Asian expeditions in the GW) would follow this command to the letter. It must be understood that the KNIL in 1952 was an organization that was different from itself in 1935. Experience modern wars created a battle-hardened organization that was brutally efficient in the way it carried out its operations, which was out of the norm in the regular Dutch military, with the exception of the Royal Dutch Marines and the Korps ''Speciale Stoot Troepen''.
[[File:KNIL soldiers of the 9th Batavian regiment fighting.jpg|thumb|233x233px|Soldiers of the 9th Regiment in Johor, firing from their positions.]]
On May the 7th KNIL forces landed of the 9th Batavian regiment landed on the island of Singapura in front of Djohor after facing limited naval opposition. They fought with the sultan's forces stationed on the island for 6 days- and in a slow but steady push they eventually took the island for use as a forwards operations base. Over the subsequent weeks KNIL forces surrounded the city of Djohor proper winning several battles with the under equipped and poorly organized forces of the Sultan. A the end of the month, the city had been breached and the rebellion had quickly turned to urban warfare, fighting block by block, house per house, street by street leading to the partial destruction of the city.
 
The last week of May 1952 has later been referred to as "'''''The Butchering of Djohor'''''" due to the widespread atrocities committed by KNIL soldiers. Reports of mass killings of civilians, rape & torture are attested to by first hand and third party investigation of the event. Additionally the KNIL were known to utilize 'death squads' in rounding up opposition or suspected rebel forces.
[[File:Walking past it all.jpg|thumb|KNIL soldiers with a Stier Panzerkannon, routing out the last of the resistance in the city. ]]
[[File:Walking past the ruins.jpg|thumb|A soldier of the 9th Regiment walking in Djohor, 12th of may 1952.]]
KNIL soldiers showed little mercy and did not care and saw all locals as rebels resulting in wide-scale destruction & depopulation. On the 30th of May, the Djohor palace was taken by KNIL and after an alleged period of torture the sultan of Djohor and his family were executed extrajudicially.
 
The "''Butchering of Djoho''r" saw widespread condemnation internationally especially from IRC aligned nations, the Muslim world and the newly formed ANAN. Additionally, the event had many 'knock on' effects within the DEI, radicalizing the Soendanese intelligentsia & many within the Muslim middle and lower classes across the colony. The event also saw the growth and expansion of ''National Republicanism'' within the East Indies as anti colonial political movements sought out a political ideology that could hopefully unify the anti imperial struggle in the East Indies with foreign supporters abroad. Several political scientists have also posited the theory that the destruction of the ''Partai Rakyat Islam Johor'' was a a massive boost to later national republican parties as the early PRIJ was the primary competitor of early national republican parties like the ''Partai Pembebasan Hindia Timur.''
 
==Start of the revolt==
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===Operation Slachthuis===
Operation Slachthuis was launched on the eve of 1965, on the 2nd of January 1966 by the Krijgsmacht & KNIL. It was the rapid and sustained escalation of the military operations against the Soendanese rebels with the objective of neutralizing Soendanese fighting capabilities, it was launched as the whole military capabilities of the Netherlands were reorganized in the east indies.
 
The four objectives of the operation (which evolved over time) were to boost the morale of the Landmacht & KNIL militaries at the time, promote the newly established regime in Batavia, and persuade the Soendanese rebels to come to the negotiation table, destroy Soendanese logistical systems, lower their morale and destroy their ability to fight this war sustainably by destroying their limited industrial ability, halt the flow of men and material into Dutch controlled lands and weaken their air defence systems. It was also launched to send a message to the Dutch allies that they were in this fight to win it, that they were able to fight it and to its opponents that they should not underestimate them.
 
The operation became one of the most intense air/ground battles waged before the blooding and the final years of the war. It was a difficult campaign since the enemies were distributed across the islands, they had a mixture of Russian fighter interceptors and sophisticated air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons. This created one of the most effective air defences at the time, yet after the operation was done this air defence network was weakened and in some places destroyed completely. It did eventually see the Netherlands achieve its goal of severly destroying Soendanese air defense capabilities in the critical fronts.
 
== 1967-1972 (Stalemate)==
The next 6 years (1966 - 1972) were marked by small-scale, jungle warfare, with intermittent periods of high-intensity large-scale operations conducted by both sides. At the time the Netherlands maintained control over large portions of southern Sumatra, all of the Malaysian peninsula, Java and most urban centers on those islands, with Borneo and Celebs being the areas where urban centers were heavily contested.
dThe next 5 years (1967-1972) were marked by the rebels and the Dutch recuperating their losses, stabilising frontlines, and modernising their fighting forces at a rapid pace. With Dutch control of Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula by 1969 was relegated to the coastal areas and urban centers. To deal with the new strategic reality of the situation, the KNIL was operationally integrated into the armed forces. At the same time, the usage of large-scale bombing raids, that devastated entire sections of the jungle became the norm. All of this was possible as the early investments were bearing the fruits of their labour, more advanced weapon systems, aerospace systems and ships were becoming available in massive numbers, combined with the increase in available manpower made allowed the Netherlands to become a larger and more high-quality force.
 
The rebels did not sit idle, controlling the interior of Sumatra and the Malaya peninsula they were able to properly build up their forces. Moving away from just an unconditional force and towards a mixed force. While never able to beat the Dutch in an open battle their new strategic concept would be that of weakened battle, bleed the dutch with a thousand cuts rather than one punch. It was a period where fighting still was taking place and by all measures was quite intense. For the east indies crisis, it was silent, for everyone knew that both sides were preparing for the slugfest that would become the final part
To deal with the new strategic reality of the theatre of operations, in that they were increasingly fighting overwhelming numbers, the KNIL units were more and more separated on an operational level yet integrated from a divisional command level. It would see an increase in large-scale bombing operations that devastated entire sections of the jungles, cities and other key areas where t was assumpted that rebel activity was present. This destroyed entire regions of Soenda and even eradicated several species as their biomes were destroyed. This massive scale of devastation was possible due to the fruition of early investments, and more advanced weapon systems that increased the firepower available to any platform and increased the network integrated and shortened the kill chain.
 
The rebels tho did not sit idle, controlling the interior of Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula they were able to properly build up some armoured forces. They moved towards a hybrid doctrine of indirect warfare and conventional operations. While they were never able to beat the Dutch in an open battle, both in the air, land and on the waters, they were able in their view to bleed the Dutch out, by a thousand cuts. Killing more and more Dutch soldiers thus decreasing morale at home.
 
Thus where the fighting was mixed and relatively stable with the exception of the relatively major operations every 5 months. Both sides knew that the other was preparing for a massive start and increase in combat operations.
 
=== Operatie: Dolle dinsdag ===
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====A change at home====
For despiteDespite the near constant talksreports aboutof the massivemass casualties that werecassualities inflicted upon the enemy, nothingthere seemed to stopbe no stopping them. DutchAt soldiersthe weretime fightingof bloody it was estimated that for monthsevery withoutDutch anysoldier that was restkilled, 4 Soendanese fighters where killed. Dutch soldiers where fighting for day and night allfor ofmonths thison inend on a level of brutality that was unseen. ExhaustionExuastion, depression and an increasing amount of alcohol andalchohol, drug useconsumtion amongamongst the soldiers comingwhere backbecoming more appearent. It was a period that when soldiers where rotated out these soldiers, withoften boysjust barely 18 year old came back as being broken. whenIt cominghad homebecome leda tonorm even a strongsadistic anti-warrite sentimentof passage. AllThis of thiswas combined with the condemnationfact that the Netherlandsway gotthe onDutch fought, the internationallevel stage,of brutaltiy led to a great deal of international condemnation on the bucketinternational overflowingstage. AfterAll of this came ahead when for the first time in nearly 13 years of war,constant aheavy trulyfighting massivethe first large anti- war protestdemonstrations took place in Amsterdam.
 
On theThe 18th of April 1974, the Netherlandsnetherlands sawcame itsto a halt, as the largest anti- war protest to date was organised. ItThis wasprotests where not just the regulardraft protestsdodgers, the studentsanti thewar pacifistpoliticians and thestudents, likethese thatprotestors came.included Theythe weremothers joined byof the roughly 3.4boys, veterans of thisthe war, allfathers whoand were relatively youngsons, joinedbrothers bythat lost their fathersolder whobrother. oftenIt themselveshad eitherbecome foughta inwar where the eastfathers orfought were veterans fromin the greatsame war, joined byas their motherssons, wives,they girlfriends,where friendsjoined andby allthe thosegirlfriends, loved once’s of those that were fightingwives. People no longer wanted to see their husbands, boyfriends, sons, brothers and friends die in the far east. PeoplePpeople at this point simply had enough of the war, afterthey 13had yearsseen of seeing the warit on their TVstvs and it had fundamentally changed the Dutch nation. In schools children where already being trained for the service in the east, an entire generation had been molded into fighting machines.
 
The scale of these protests where immense, the entire nation in essence came to a halt. Public transports where jammed full, towns where turned into ghost towns all the while in the Hague, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Rotterdam the police forces where unwilling to disperse the protests. People where tired and it left the government with little options as their last option seemed to be the military.
[[File:Protest I.jpg|thumb|A large group of Dutch citizen in Den Haag protesting the war, they where just one many. As the picture shows people from all ages joined in the protests.]]
 
TheyPrime wereminister soGeert largeDijkman, thata primeman ministerwho Geerthad Dijkmanbeen PM for 3 years, a proponent of the war and an arch conservative, had ordered his cabinet and the military to prepare for a revolutionworst hecase soscenario, feareda revolution. It was at this moment tho that the military her general staff made it clear they would not fire uponon their own men,. forAs thesemany of the protestors werewhere oftenreservists, wearingveterans theiror even active duty soldiers on uniformsleave. These protestsprotetors had their intended effect, eventually andit caused a silent revolution, ofthe April,so withincalled theapril samerevolution. monthIt led to a votemotion of no confidence passedbeing issued to the secondcabinet by chamberparliament and the senate. This led to a new election wasto be scheduled for the 17th of juliJuli 1974.
 
Despite their best efforts the party of the old prime minister “Conservative anti revolutionaire partij (CARP) stood no change in the election. They where defeated in a landslide by the Partij voor democracy (PVD). Led by veteran turned politican Koen Haverman, who had fought in operation Slachthuis. On the 25th of July 1974 he became the new prime minister of the Netherlands, his party gaining some 83 seats in the lower house resulting in an absolute majority. Their objective was simple on paper, pull out of hte conflict but as he would find out it was far harder in practice.[[File:Protest I.jpg|thumb|A large group of Dutch citizen in Den Haag protesting the war, they where just one many. As the picture shows people from all ages joined in the protests.]]
These protests were so large that for the entire day the nation was shut down, public transport was jammed, and cities had turned into ghost towns. All the while in the Hague, Amsterdam and Rotterdam the police forces were unwilling to do anything against their own friends in many cases they even joined the protestors. In other words, the government was in chaos.
 
[[File:Koen Haverman 3.jpg|alt=Barend Biesheuvel is used as a stand in for the PM|thumb|Koen Haverman the new prime minister of the Netherlands meeting with the monarch]]
They were so large that prime minister Geert Dijkman ordered his cabinet and the military to prepare for a revolution he so feared. It was at this moment tho that the military general staff made clear they would not fire upon their own men, for these protestors were often wearing their uniforms. These protests had their intended effect eventually and caused a silent revolution of April, within the same month a vote of no confidence passed the second chamber and a new election was scheduled for the 17th of juli 1974
 
Despite their best efforts the party of the old prime minister de “Conservatieve anti revolutionare partij or CARP, stood no change. They were soundly defeated by the Partij voor Democracy “PVD” led by former veteran turned politician Koen Haverman who on the 25th of July 1974 become the new prime minister of the Netherlands. Out of the 150 seats in the second chamber, the PVD won a total of 83 ensuring that no coalition was needed and allowing them to push their agenda forward. Their agenda was simple on paper, pull out of the archipelago, in reality, tho this would be a hard one to achieve.[[File:Koen Haverman 3.jpg|alt=Barend Biesheuvel is used as a stand in for the PM|thumb|Koen Haverman the new prime minister of the Netherlands meeting with the monarch]]
 
=== '''New Minister, New Policy'''===
With the ascension of Koen Haverman, withthe hisfundamental Partijnature van Democratieof the Dutchwar policychanged onfor the eastDutch. indiesThe crisis, oroorlog as it was knownsimply inrefered theto Haguehad “Dereadically oorlog”changed oralmost theovernight, warfrom radicallynow changedon almosttheir overnight.objective Koenwould Havermanbe wonto hispull electionout partlyof bythe statingfighting theyin would findsuch a way tothe pullNetherlands outremained ofin thea conflictfuture adventagous position. Athe conflict that had taken the best of the Netherlands her youth and swallowed it whole, onlyspitting leaving behindout broken and scattered boysmen who had seen far tooto much atbrutality afor far tootheir young ageages. It had put a strain on the Netherlands her social services and culture and people, whoall have watchedof it allhad been radically transformed. People had wachted the war for nearly 16 yearsyeras on their Tvstvs, werethey where tired and sort of used to it by now. Koen Haverman, who himself had fought in theit war during the early stagesand knew the horror, ofyet it and thusknew the momentstrategic hereality was appointednot byas thesimple. monarch began to work on a way to get the Netherlands out.
 
Pulling the Netherlands out was never going to be easy, nobody expected it would be easy, nor would it be done within a short timeframe. The strategic situation in the east when Haverman became PM was a dire one. Soendanese forces where conducted their largest contious offensive in the war so far. The soldiers on the ground where fighting tooth and nail on all fronts to just hold the line for months upon months, as the peace protests where happening in Amsterdam, the men in Malaysia where fighting for their lives. It had reached a point where any point of civility was dropped by the Dutch and the usage of chemical agents, Napalm and other assets where used to hold the tite. Cassualty reports coming in where grim, at this rate military planners in the Hague estimated Batavia would fall within 8 months. Tvs showed the battles raging in the air and on land on Sumatra, Borneo and Celebs, it showed the true brutality of war. It was said that Haverman for the first viewed classified reports on the war he vommited. The reports contained numbers so gruesome and operations so illigal that went against any public policy the netherlands portrayed, it showed the pure barbarity a industrial state could inflict.
 
Thus the order went out to the general staff to come up with a way the Netherlands could pull out, without major losses. Its order was vague and by this point the General staff, consisting of hardened veterans came up with the exit strategy, something that still would inflict utter destruction. Commander of the armed Forces Generaal Cornelis van Langen stated;
 
“''It will be a fucked up affair…require time and we need to murder those bastards by the bushes''”.
 
Habverman tho was determined he wanted the Dutch our of the war, thus Van Langen despite his reservations started to work on such a strategy. They worked tirelessly and in those 4 months the fighting continued across the east, Dutch forces where using more and more brutality, to a point where the forces around Jambi annaliated the city. When the news came in it was on the same day that van Langen showed his operation. Operatie Vertrek, it would take roughly 1 year 6 months, to compelte as nothing was to be left behind and strategic positions where to be maintained, as well as vital trade links with Tauland. It would be carried out in phases and it would continously require them to keep on the fighting, on a high intense level as to not give up any strategic ground. On the day that Jambi burned to the ground and 489,012 people died the strategy was agreed upon.[[File:Troops under fire.jpg|thumb|A soldier watching air support drop its payload upon the enemy her positions, somewhere around Malakka.]]
 
==Operatie Vertrek I==
Early on the plan of Operatie Vertrek-II was a complicated one, while it was never openly stated, everyone understood that the puppet regime in Batavia would not survive. While this did not matter a great deal, considering that most of these people in the government were on the Dutch payroll. While this decision did not hamper the military activities that much, it did hamper the social services the puppet regime provided and the taxation strategy, many of the native bureaucrats became demotivated and descent within the KNIL was slowly forming.
 
Another effect of the decision of Vertrek was the decline in the morale of the NCO corps of the military, these men were career soldiers and had many friends that died in the war and saw little purpose to fight. While in general combat operations remained highly effective it was well known that in the barracks descent was common. This also was evident with the general infantry, as while it was made known the Netherlands would pull out, conscription kept on going, rotations kept happening and combat remained intense.
 
=== Operation "Mistig" ===
 
=== Loss of eastern Java ===
 
Pulling the Netherlands out was however the hard part, for it was easier said than done. The situation at the time of Haverman coming into office was a dire one. The EILF was conducting their largest continuous offensive in the war so far, the Netherlands was engaged on all fronts soldiers were fighting for months and months, and all pretenses of civility were dropped. Casualty reports coming in were grim, pictures coming in were grimmer and all the news coming in on video was dark and too intense to even show on TV. Battles raging on Sumatra and Borneo and Celebs were brutal and it is said that when Haverman for the first time viewed the classified reports of the war he vomited. The reports contained numbers so gruesome and tactics and fighting on that were against everything that the Netherlands claimed to uphold.
 
He thus ordered the commanders of the military to come up with a plan to pull the Dutch forces out in such a manner that they would not be attacked from the rear. The immediate answer by that time Commander of the Armed Forces <u>Generaal Cornelis van Langen</u>, was that it would be hard bloody, and require a lot of time. Yet Haverman was determined he wanted the Dutch their forces out of the war. Thus van Langen despite his own involvement in the creation of Dutch strategy started with his team to work on a plan to pull the Netherlands out of the war. He worked tirelessly and by November 1974 some 4 months after the initial order was given they had a plan. In those 4 months, however, the fighting continued across the East Indies and the Dutch forces seemed to show less and less mercy. van Langen dubbed the plan '''Operatie Vertrek-I''' (Leaving One), it was a detailed set of objectives that would see the pullout in phases of Dutch forces while also taking into account civilians. It would take roughly 1.6 years to complete as nothing was to be left behind, it would be done in phases and it would continuously require the Dutch forces to keep on fighting with a higher degree of intensity as to not give off any idea to the enemy. He proposed the plan to the cabinet of Haverman and on the 1st of December 1974, it was accepted and made official military policy.[[File:Troops under fire.jpg|thumb|A soldier watching air support drop its payload upon the enemy her positions, somewhere around Malakka.]]
 
==Fall= evacuation of Batavia (1976)===
“De laaste ronde” De Bataafse evacuatie” or the fall of Batavia as its sometimes called is the name given to the final months of fighting of the East indies crisis. the period is often said to have ended at exactly 23:48 11 November 1976, when the last Dutch ship left the port of Batavia and when the Soendanese rebels took over the city after a brutal siege.
 
Historians mark the start of “De laaste ronde” when prime minister Haberman accepted the Krijgmacht her so-called “vertrek” operation. The operation in detail laid out the withdrawal of Dutch & KNIL forces from the various theatres in the archipelago, it was not a complete withdrawal but rather a slow methodical withdrawal toward strategic and defensible positions. It would be from there that the final departure would be organized. During this time the Dutch would maintain full-on air and naval supremacy and keep raids at a maximum. On paper this plan was good in practice tho once implemented it became a bloody affair as the fighting withdrawals were intense. Dutch soldiers had fought in an archipelago for 16 brutal years, indoctrinated by over a decade of propaganda were unwilling to just let go without a fight. the final battles and operations were thus often considered brutal as entire stockpiles of munitions were emptied.
 
==== Rogue KNIL units ====
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==== Operatie Retributie ====
 
Operatie Retributie, or “De laaste lag”, was a military operation that started on the 11th of November 1976 and technically ended on the 31st of December 1976. In reality, it lasted up until 1981. The operation would see the Netherlands conducting large-scale evacuation operations, commando raids, air raids and maritime raids against the Soendanese. This was to both protect Nieuw Batavia and to hamper potential reprisals against Nieuw Batavia, remaining Dutch interests, and Dutch shipping throughout the strait of Malacca & Thai canal. This also saw the Netherlands openly supporting Pinang in its fight against the Soendanese.
 
It is noted by many historians, both in the Netherlands, Soenda and across the world that operation Retribution was also the cover of a large rescue operation. Throughout the war, Dutch soldiers left many children, these children were in danger of growing up in a likely hostile nation, thus the operation was launched to rescue many of these children. While these children did not arrive in the Netherlands they were brought to places like Pinang and Zeylan.
 
==Aftermath ==
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==Impact on popular culture ==
 
== Crimes occuring during the EIC ==
Netherlands
 
Soenda
 
== Impact on modern day warfare ==
Bureaucrats, rtl-contributors, Administrators
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