East Indies Crisis: Difference between revisions

 

While Dutch and KNIL units consistently achieved victory in individual battles, Dutch forces suffered a high attrition rate. Long-range patrols conducted by the KNIL frequently resulted in casualties, with up to three out of every ten soldiers killed and an additional four wounded. It became increasingly clear that the Dutch forces' existing strategy, which focused on holding and reclaiming territory, was unsustainable in the face of rising casualties. The Soendanese rebels possessed superior knowledge of the terrain, maintained higher recruitment rates, benefited from shorter supply lines, and had access to advanced weaponry. This alarming attrition rate compelled a significant reassessment within the Dutch command structure, catalyzed by the events of the New Year's offensive.

 

In April 1963, Lieutenant-General Cornelis van Langen of the Dutch Army proposed a new strategic doctrine, which came to be known as the ''Van'' ''Langen Doctrine''. This new doctrine redefined victory as the destruction of the enemy's war-making capabilities rather than territorial control. It advocated the establishment of strategic strongholds in key urban centers, economic sites, and coastal regions for offensive operations. The Dutch military adopted an aggressive, offensive posture, targeting enemy assets such as supply depots, recruitment zones, and sympathetic population centers relentlessly.[[File:Cornelis van Langen 1.jpg|thumb|Cornelis van Langen in 1964|208x208px]]This approach emphasized rapid mobility, strong command structures, and a focus on denying and destroying enemy resources. Because of the doctrine's more aggressive outlook, it was sometimes pejoratively referred to as the ''terreurdoctrine'' ("terror doctrine").{{Blockquote|text=“Annihilate the rebels' ability to fight the war, not just this one but for all future conflicts.”|author=Cornelis van Langen}}On the 22nd of March 1963, Van Langen proposed this idea to the general staff, and it received approval on the 23rd of March 1963. As a result, Cornelis was promoted to the rank of General with a straightforward mission: to initiate military reform. On the same day, rapid planning began for the transformation of the Netherlands' military. Units were strategically withdrawn to designated areas, leaving the SLA forces in confusion as the Netherlands vacated recently reclaimed territories. This consolidation of valuable territory allowed rotation of veteran troops back to the [[Netherlands]] or [[Zeylan]] for retraining, while newly formed forces took their place.

=== Operation Slachthuis (1965) ===

Operation ''Slachthuis'', launched on the 2nd of January 1966 by the ''Krijgsmacht'' (Netherlands Armed Forces) and ''KNIL'' (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army), marked a significant and sustained escalation in military operations against the Soendanese rebels in Soematra.

Initially, the operation had four evolving objectives: first, to boost the morale of the Dutch forces; second, to induce the Soendanese Liberation Army (SLA) to engage in negotiations by disrupting their logistical systems, lowering their morale, and crippling their limited industrial capacity; third, to obstruct the SLA's flow of men and materials into Dutch-controlled territories; and fourth, to weaken the SLA's air defense systems. Additionally, the operation aimed to send a clear message to Dutch allies, affirming their commitment to winning the conflict and their capability to do so.

 

== Stalemate (1966-1972) ==

The following six years were characterized by a persistent pattern of small-scale jungle warfare, with intermittent periods of high-intensity military operations undertaken by both Dutch and Soendanese forces. During this period, the Netherlands maintained control over significant portions of southern Soematra, the coastal parts of the Malay peninsula, Java, and most urban centers within these regions. The contested areas were primarily Borneo and Celebes, where control of urban centers was fiercely disputed.

To deal with the new strategic reality of the theatre of operations, characterized by the challenge of facing numerically superior enemy forces, the KNIL units underwent operational decentralization while maintaining integration at the divisional command level. This era witnessed a notable increase in large-scale bombing operations that inflicted extensive damage on entire sections of jungles, urban areas, and other key areas believed to be hubs of rebel activity. The scale of devastation was unprecedented, causing harm not only to human populations but also leading to the extinction of several species due to the destruction of their habitats.

 

 

=== Final Years of the War ===

By late 1973, any pretense that this conflict was merely an internal police action had vanished, both in propaganda and Dutch official reports. While the Dutch military was capable of addressing these assaults on the theater level, the overwhelming number of enemy armored units and infantry placed the Dutch at a significant disadvantage, with military experts placing odds as low as one to seven. This shifting dynamic prompted a transformation in the mindset of not only commanders but also frontline soldiers. This shift was notably evident in the evolving operational doctrine. The prior principles of "ask first, shoot second" and the exercise of restraint gave way to a more straightforward approach: prioritize neutralizing the enemy to preempt any threats to one's own forces.