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East Indies Crisis: Difference between revisions
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==== PKKN and SLF Consolidation (1960-1962) ====
The period from 1960 to 1962 was characterized by the consolidation of the PKKN and SLF, against the backdrop of an ongoing low-intensity 'colonial war.' During this time, the PKKN, guided by its new leadership, gained enough legitimacy to attract direct funding and support from international powers, notably the [[Russia|Russian National Republic]]. It was reported that Russian operatives were embedded within the party, and there were indications of Russia smuggling equipment to the Soenda Liberation Front via [[Thaitania|Thaitania.]]
==== Northern Soematran Uprising (1960) ====
An uprising in northern Soematra in February 1960 had escalated into a full-fledged revolt by January 1st, 1962. The KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) had been gradually pushed out of the northern and central interior, confining their presence to the coastal regions, while retaining control over the southern parts of Soematra. Simultaneously, uprisings also erupted in Malaya, Borneo, and Celebes, further exacerbating the strain on the KNIL's already limited manpower. However, these uprisings were swiftly suppressed.
==== Deployment of European Dutch troops to Soenda (1962) ====
On February 1st, 1962, the States-General of the Netherlands authorized the deployment of 120,000 Dutch soldiers to Soenda, with the mission of assisting the KNIL in suppressing the rebellions and restoring Dutch authority over the archipelago. Throughout the year, Dutch forces appeared to be making progress, successfully crushing revolts on various islands and reclaiming control over central Soematra. This process followed a conventional colonial campaign strategy, focusing on securing major population centers before expanding further. Unbeknownst to the Dutch forces, however, the Soendanese Liberation Army (SLA) continued to grow its ranks by recruiting from the countryside, which remained beyond Dutch control but was still perceived as conquerable.
== Phase of Fire (1963-1967) ==
=== New Year Offensive (1963) ===
On New Year's Eve in 1963, a significant turning point occurred when the SLA initiated a major conventional assault on strategically vital areas held by Dutch forces in central and northern Soematra. Notably, this offensive targeted Padang in northwest Soematra and Pekanbaroe in central Soematra. The Liberation Front's conventional attack caught Dutch forces off guard as it involved the utilization of older Russian tanks and heavy weaponry, including artillery and mortars. The element of surprise, combined with the timing of the assault on New Year's Eve, severely limited the Dutch's capacity to mount an effective response. Consequently, the Dutch lost control of Padang and Pekanbaru, resulting in the establishment of a new frontline extending across Jambi and the interior of southern Soematra.[[File:A soldier in Sumatra during the new years offensive.jpg|thumb|A Dutch soldier near Palembang during the fighting around the city in late February.|273x273px]]The New Year Offensive, marked a pivotal transformation in the nature of the conflict. Previously characterized as a simple "colonial conflict" where rebels engaged in asymmetric warfare while the Dutch adopted a strategy of limited action, this new phase witnessed a shift due to the SLA's firm control over northern and central Soematra. Despite the relatively modest size of their operational base, the rebels were able to bolster their forces. Simultaneously, the offensive demonstrated that the Dutch were not invincible, prompting the revolutionary fervor to more effectively permeate the entire archipelago.
Two months after the offensive, as the SLA had stabilized the frontlines, the Dutch began to adopt a more concerted approach. This period witnessed the initial extensive utilization of strategic bombers and an increasing prevalence of shoreline bombardments. Search and Destroy tactics became the norm. However, it is essential to note that despite these developments, the conflict still retained its primarily guerrilla character. The Dutch, boasting superior firepower, consistently outmatched any conventional forces the rebels could muster.]
=== Dutch response: the Lange Doctrine ===
The following years saw guerrilla strikes became more frequent. Soematra, which had initially been the focal point, now represented just one of the many fronts in the conflict. Between 1963 and 1967, the Dutch engaged in a brutal campaign against an ever-growing insurgent force. Entire villages were razed, and the widespread use of chemical agents such as tear gas, along with the deployment of napalm firebombing, transformed once-thriving jungles into desolate wastelands.
While Dutch and KNIL units consistently achieved victory in individual battles, the challenges of patrolling the central regions of Soematra revealed an unsustainable pattern due to a high attrition rate. Long-range patrols conducted by the KNIL frequently resulted in casualties, with up to three out of every ten soldiers killed and an additional four wounded. It became increasingly clear that the Dutch forces' existing strategy, which focused on holding and reclaiming territory, could not be sustained in the face of rising casualties. The Soendanese rebels possessed superior knowledge of the terrain, maintained higher recruitment rates, benefited from shorter supply lines, and had access to advanced weaponry. This alarming attrition rate compelled a significant reassessment within the Dutch command structure, catalyzed by the events of the New Year's offensive.
In April 1963, Lieutenant-General Cornelis van Langen of the Dutch Army proposed a new strategic doctrine, which came to be known as the ''Van'' ''Langen Doctrine''. This new doctrine redefined victory as the destruction of the enemy's war-making capabilities rather than territorial control. It advocated the establishment of strategic strongholds in key urban centers, economic sites, and coastal regions for offensive operations. The Dutch military adopted an aggressive, offensive posture, targeting enemy assets such as supply depots, recruitment zones, and sympathetic population centers relentlessly.[[File:Cornelis van Langen 1.jpg|thumb|Cornelis van Langen in 1964|208x208px]]This approach emphasized rapid mobility, strong command structures, and a focus on denying and destroying enemy resources. Because of the doctrine's more aggressive outlook, it was sometimes pejoratively referred to as the ''terreurdoctrine'' ("terror doctrine").{{Blockquote|text=“Annihilate the rebels' ability to fight the war, not just this one but for all future conflicts.”|author=Cornelis van Langen}}On the 22nd of March 1963, Van Langen proposed this idea to the general staff, and it received approval on the 23rd of March 1963. As a result, Cornelis was promoted to the rank of General with a straightforward mission: to initiate military reform. On the same day, rapid planning commenced for the transformation of the Netherlands' military. Units were strategically withdrawn to designated areas, leaving the SLA forces in confusion as the Netherlands vacated recently reclaimed territories. This consolidation of valuable territory allowed rotation of veteran troops back to the [[Netherlands]] or [[Zeylan]] for retraining, while newly formed forces took their place.
The short respite, lasting from March 1963 until early 1964, witnessed a swift transformation in the training and overall capabilities of Dutch forces. During this period, there was a substantial buildup of personnel and resources to support the new approach to warfare. Initially, Russian intelligence sources were unable to discern the underlying cause of this rapid shift in doctrine, equipment, and related factors. Contrary to popular belief, this transformation was not an abrupt change but rather the consolidation of pre-existing plans for the rapid replacement of equipment, including armored vehicles, air assets, uniforms, and weaponry.
This shift in military doctrine was not entirely unprecedented; it had roots dating back to the [[Great War|Great War (1935-1939)]], with the Netherlands enacting a law after the Great War requiring all factories to maintain the ability to switch to wartime production as technology advanced. This, coupled with the nation's defense policy that allowed for the rapid conscription of a large portion of the population, laid the foundation for such a doctrinal shift.
==== Reforms to the Dutch Conscription System ====
By the end of March, orders had been sent to most military companies, outlining the requirements for the development of new weaponry. The unprecedented pace of weapon delivery marked a significant moment in Dutch military history, leading to the mass production of highly effective and efficient military equipment. Simultaneously, orders were made with specific specifications at foreign factories in [[Tauland]] and [[New Netherland]]. A notable change came in the reorganization and reformation of the conscription system, known as ''Dienstplicht''. The service duration was extended to 24 months, with six months dedicated to more extensive basic training aimed at enhancing military quality. The remaining eighteen months months involved deployment, with the obligation to be called up for service in times of conflict extending up to the age of 50.
Before these organizational reforms, ''Dienstplicht'' had primarily served a "reserve" role, focused on expanding the size of the reserves. However, the reforms, including the expansion of the training regimen and educational requirements, resulted in Dutch conscripts becoming superior to those of any other nation at the time. This enhancement in the military education of the average conscript was essential to accommodate the new style of mobile warfare, which could not thrive under the old requirements.
Although these changes were not popular with the Dutch public, they were passed in parliament, leading to increased military spending. This period also witnessed the emergence of the anti-war movement, advocating for the Netherlands to withdraw from Soenda and seek a peaceful resolution.
==== Operation Testveld (1963) ====
All these reforms were put to the test in December 1963 during Operation ''Testveld'', where approximately 12,000 newly trained recruits, equipped with the latest gear and undergoing a new training regime, were deployed in Malaya. The operation yielded significant success, with around 57,000 enemy combatants killed at the cost of 1,200 Dutch casualties, affirming the effectiveness of these reforms.
=== Operation Slachthuis (1965) ===
Operation ''Slachthuis'', launched on the 2nd of January 1966 by the ''Krijgsmacht'' (Netherlands Armed Forces) and ''KNIL'' (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army), marked a significant and sustained escalation in military operations against the Soendanese rebels in Soematra.
Initially, the operation had four evolving objectives: first, to boost the morale of the Dutch forces; second, to induce the Soendanese Liberation Army (SLA) to engage in negotiations by disrupting their logistical systems, lowering their morale, and crippling their limited industrial capacity; third, to obstruct the SLA's flow of men and materials into Dutch-controlled territories; and fourth, to weaken the SLA's air defense systems. Additionally, the operation aimed to send a clear message to Dutch allies, affirming their commitment to winning the conflict and their capability to do so.
The operation saw the most intense air-to-ground battles from 1966-1967. This campaign was exceptionally challenging due to the scattered distribution of enemies across various islands, equipped with a mix of Russian fighter interceptors and advanced air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons. This allowed the SLA to create a highly effective air defense network. However, by the conclusion of the operation, this air defense network had been significantly weakened, and in certain areas, completely dismantled.
== Course of the crisis ==
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==== Military operations between Dutch and Soendanese forces ====
The unrest in the East Indies escalated into a full-blown rebellion by 1962. Forces of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) were pushed out from the interiors to the coastlines due to uprisings in
The period between 1963 and 1967, known as the "Phase of Fire", saw a change in war strategy, focusing on strategic targets over territorial acquisition. Major restructuring in the military enabled the successful testing of the reforms during Operation ''Testveld'' in December 1963. Operation Slachthuis, launched by Dutch forces on January 2nd, 1966, was an attempt to neutralize the Soendanese rebels by focusing on strategic objectives such as boosting morale, solidifying Dutch rule in Batavia, destroying Soendanese logistics and recruitment efforts, and demonstrating Dutch military power. This eventually led to a stalemate phase from 1967 to 1972.
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